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I. INTRODUCTION
To American legal education, the significance of being able to think like a lawyer lies 
not only in its potential to encompass significant educational imperatives but also in 
the powerful pedagogy with which the phrase is inextricably linked.1
 Referring to classic Socratic questioning, the authors of the widely-praised 
Carnegie Report thus sweepingly (and accurately) advance the invisible syllogism 
undergirding the design of legal education in the United States:
  1. American law students must learn to “think like lawyers.”
  2. Case-based Socratic dialogue is what teaches students to think like  
   lawyers.
  3. Therefore law schools base their primary teaching on Socratic discussion  
   of assigned case law.2 
The Report acknowledges the utility of the Socratic method, which provides a kind 
of “cognitive apprenticeship” in legal thinking,3 but bemoans the fact that other 
approaches to and dimensions of legal education are too often thought of as 
add-ons.4  As an alternative to the traditional model, the Report calls for a more 
effective integration of clinical education and doctrinal teaching.5
 The authors of the Carnegie Report and most commentators on legal training in 
the United States take as a given the notion that courses in basic legal doctrine, 
taught through Socratic questioning about assigned series of cases, are fundamental 
not only, or even primarily, because they teach about basic topics of law, but because 
they hone students’ habits of mind.6  In short, the Carnegie Report authors, like 
many observers of legal education, appear to take for granted the second proposition 
1. William M. Sullivan et al., Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of Law 47 
(2007) [hereinafter Carnegie Report].
2. This construction deliberately echoes the traditional syllogism pattern: “All men are mortal.  Socrates is 
a man.  Therefore, Socrates is mortal.”  Ruggero J. Aldisert, Logic for Lawyers: A Guide for 
Clear Legal Thinking 46 (3d ed. 1997).  The pattern is frequently used to teach deductive reasoning, 
to the point that its inclusion in textbooks designed to introduce law students to legal reasoning is 
commonplace, perhaps even expected.  See, e.g., id. at 46–47; Charles R. Calleros, Legal Method 
and Writing 68 (5th ed. 2006); Cathy Glaser et al., The Lawyer’s Craft: An Introduction 
to Legal Analysis, Writing, Research, and Advocacy 64 (2002); Nadia E. Nedzel, Legal 
Reasoning, Research, and Writing for International Graduate Students 68–69 (2d ed. 
2008). 
3. Carnegie Report, supra note 1, at 28. 
4. See id. at 191–92. 
5. See id. at 194–200.  A main focus of the Carnegie Report is to advocate for what it calls an integrative 
approach to each aspect of the legal apprenticeship—the cognitive, the practical, and the ethical-social. 
Id.
6. See, e.g., Martha Rice Martini, Marx Not Madison: The Crisis of American Legal Education 
58 (1997).  But see Roy Stuckey et al., Best Practices for Legal Education: A Vision and A 
Road Map 130–61 (2007) (raising questions about the efficacy of using Socratic dialogue as the sole 
means of large-classroom teaching in law schools, and discussing ways in which the technique may best 
be employed); Peggy Cooper Davis & Elizabeth Ehrenfest Steinglass, A Dialogue About Socratic Teaching, 
23 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 249 (1997) (providing support for the analysis of the use of Socratic 
teaching set forth in Best Practices for Legal Education).
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in our invisible legal education conjecture:7 that case reading and attendant interactive 
questioning constitute the way to teach law students the intricacies of legal reasoning.8 
Further, they seem to presume (wrongly in many cases)9 that the goal of acculturating 
law students into the rigors of legal reasoning is substantially accomplished at the 
conclusion of the boot camp-style immersion students receive from the outset of 
their legal education.10
 This explains why we often openly acknowledge that students may not necessarily 
retain the finer points of, say, vicarious liability doctrine in tort law—most important 
is that they learn how to approach and reason their way through the legal problems.11 
Once they have significantly mastered that skill, the thinking goes, law students are 
ready to begin to learn more precisely the subject matter that they may encounter 
after graduation, as well as to begin studying the less conceptual skills that they will 
need in their profession.  Clinical education in all of its forms exists to serve this 
7. I use the term “conjecture” here as mathematicians and logicians do: to mean something generally 
presumed to be accurate, but not yet irrefutably proven.  Merriam-Webster’s dictionary gives as its third 
definition of the term, specific to mathematics, “a proposition . . . before it has been proved or disproved.” 
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 263 (11th ed. 2003).  But the connotation of the term 
generally carries with it the presumption that the conclusion is probably true.  See, e.g., Wiktionary, 
http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/conjecture (last visited Nov. 14, 2008) (indicating that, in mathematics, 
the term refers to a statement “likely to be true based on available evidence, but which has not been 
formally proven”).
8. I am somewhat overgeneralizing here, of course.  More importantly, in using the broadest and most base 
stereotypes about learning in law school, this discussion necessarily omits the now widespread 
acknowledgment of the central role that first-year training in legal writing has in acculturating students 
to legal thinking.  But in seeking to describe the hallmark of contemporary indoctrination into legal 
modes of reasoning, the Carnegie Report ref lexively, and almost exclusively, credits Socratic questioning 
in traditional doctrinal subjects.  See Carnegie Report, supra note 1, at 47–87, 194.  
9. The rise in the importance of the field of academic support in law schools can be seen as an 
acknowledgment that many of the students who do not thrive or initially succeed in law school are 
nonetheless capable of doing so if taught more individually, or through different means.  See Jean Boylan, 
The Admission Numbers Are Up: Is Academic Support Really Necessary?, 26 J. Juv. L. 1, 7–12 (2006) 
(assessing the value of academic support programs for ensuring the success of both traditional and non-
traditional law students in the classic legal curriculum); Paula Lustbader, From Dreams to Reality: The 
Emerging Role of Law School Academic Support Programs, 31 U.S.F. L. Rev. 839 (1997) (exploring the 
history of the academic support movement in legal education and describing how its teaching 
supplements traditional legal education). 
10. See Carnegie Report, supra note 1, at 185–86.
11. See, e.g., Sarah Lawrence-Lightfoot, Respect 166–67 (1999) (providing a profile of law professor 
David Wilkins and observing that he is little concerned about teaching substance that “might be 
accomplished through directed reading” and he sees his primary goal as helping students “feel 
comfortable and to teach them a certain way of thinking . . . what we call thinking like a lawyer”).
 Most explorations into the purposes of legal education, particularly the most foundational training 
afforded in the first year of law school, attend far more heavily to the teaching of particular habits of 
mind than to the acquisition of specific knowledge.  See, e.g., Bethany Rubin Henderson, Asking the Lost 
Question: What Is the Purpose of Law School?, 53 J. Legal Educ. 48, 56–63 (2003) (defining the primary 
purpose of contemporary legal education as learning to think as lawyers do and exploring the functional 
and normative elements of such thinking). 
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latter profoundly practical function, in complement to the doctrinal instruction and 
rehearsal of legal reasoning skills offered in casebook courses.12
 This conception of clinical teaching as an introduction to fundamental professional 
skills can undoubtedly be a good thing.13  Clinical education has long been thought 
of as a way to bring more active learning, excitement, engagement, and even passion 
into the law school environment.14  Clinical work allows, indeed encourages, students 
to connect their theoretical knowledge to the skills essential to lawyering work.  But 
this attitude also reinforces the “additive” notion that the Carnegie Report ostensibly 
deplores: the idea that clinical experiences are something in addition to basic legal 
education, not that they are basic legal education in and of themselves.15  Clinical 
education is not conceptualized as offering the same kind of “cognitive apprenticeship” 
as doctrinal classes; rather it is conceived as a complement to this education.16  In 
other words, it does not teach students to think like lawyers, it trains them to act like 
lawyers once the cognitive training is fully in place.
 Even clinicians sometimes make distinctions between the introduction to 
interactive lawyering skills thought to be taught in simulation-based classes, often 
open generally to second- and third-year law students, and the presumably more 
rigorous learning in the closely-supervised live-client clinics, usually offered only to 
small numbers of third-year students.17  The idea seems to be that the simulation 
courses are somewhat akin to training wheels for lawyering skills—an arguably 
12. With its emphasis on clinical education as a professional apprenticeship, the Carnegie Report certainly 
adopts this view of clinical education as inherently focused on the practical aspects of legal training.  See 
Carnegie Report, supra note 1, at 100, 195.
13. Indeed many have suggested, and several schools have adopted, the inclusion of training in clinical 
skills as a required part of beginning law students’ formative curriculum.  See, e.g., Stefano Moscato, 
Teaching Foundational Clinical Lawyering Skills to First-Year Students, 13 J. Legal Writing Inst. 207 
(2007). 
14. See Deborah Maranville, Passion, Context, and Lawyering Skills: Choosing Among Simulated and Real 
Clinical Experiences, 7 Clinical L. Rev. 123, 126–28 (2000).  This notion that clinical methodologies 
generate passion may account, at least in part, for the connection sometimes drawn between clinical 
education in law and the recent movement focused on “humanizing” legal education.  The “humanizing 
legal education” scholarship is not necessarily drawn directly from the pedagogical thinking of clinicians, 
but seems to take for granted that hands-on teaching in law schools better serves law students, and does 
less damage to their emotional well-being and self-confidence than more traditional large-classroom 
modes of instruction.  See Justine A. Dunlap, “I’d Just as Soon Flunk You as Look at You?” The Evolution to 
Humanizing in a Large Classroom, 47 Washburn L.J. 389, 391 (2008) (offering that “because of the 
nature of clinical legal education, most clinical law teachers do not need to do anything special to 
‘humanize’ their teaching; it is an inherent part of the undertaking”).   
15. See Carnegie Report, supra note 1, at 190–91.
16. See id. at 191.
17. Although, the distinctions among these traditional clinical offerings may be becoming blurred or 
perhaps obsolete.  See David A. Binder & Paul Bergman, Taking Lawyering Skills Training Seriously, 10 
Clinical L. Rev. 191 (2003) (asking whether “case-centered,” live-client clinical teaching effectively 
covers the basic practical skills of interviewing, counseling, or negotiation); Maranville, supra note 14, at 
130–36. 
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helpful tool in the learning progression, but only an early step toward more advanced 
course work covering the real thing.
 In this essay I want to consider what happens if we think about clinical teaching 
of law in much the same way that we have come to think about the most formative 
stages of doctrinal teaching: that is, if we assume that the specific skills and 
information clinical teaching emphasizes are important, but ancillary, benefits to the 
ultimate project of “thinking like a lawyer.”  This project is a thought experiment: I 
am not necessarily advocating for an entire reframing of the role of clinical teaching 
in legal education.  In fact, I believe that clinical education, perhaps most especially 
the classic clinical experience of students being responsible for handling actual cases 
or parts of cases under the close supervision of an experienced teacher/lawyer, does a 
remarkably good job of simultaneously training students in all of the dimensions 
described in the Carnegie Report.18  But by its very design this form of teaching is 
resource-intensive, hence usually available to only a small segment of the law school 
population.  Moreover, it tends to be seen as a pinnacle educational experience in 
legal education, rather than a basic one that is and ought to be part of students’ 
foundational learning. 
 But I believe that imagining a different set of goals in clinical teaching, 
particularly in the most introductory simulation-based courses, leads to a conclusion 
that they are excellent places to learn and reinforce basic legal analysis.19  Consequently, 
these courses can be thought of not simply as offering hands-on training in the sort 
of interactive skills not covered by large subject-driven lecture classes, nor only as an 
18. That is, by design, the interaction between senior-lawyer and junior-lawyer that constitutes the teacher/
student relationship in a live-client clinical experience necessarily provides apprenticeship in the 
cognitive, professional, and ethical domains that the Carnegie Report embraces.  See Carnegie Report, 
supra note 1, at 194–200. 
19. I focus this essay primarily on simulation-based clinical teaching in part because the purposes of live-
client clinics are somewhat different and have been amply articulated.  The legion of articles describing 
the value of having supervised students represent clients as a learning experience could not usefully be 
tallied here.  For one evocative rumination on the value of this form of clinical teaching, see Ian 
Weinstein, Teaching Reflective Lawyering in a Small Case Litigation Clinic: A Love Letter to My Clinic, 13 
Clinical L. Rev. 573 (2006).  For a book-length exploration of two professors’ thinking about their 
clinical teaching, see Philip G. Schrag & Michael Meltsner, Reflections on Clinical Legal 
Education (1998).  For a widely respected clinician’s thesis on state-of-the-art design in clinical legal 
education, see David F. Chavkin, Clinical Legal Education: A Textbook for Law School 
Clinical Programs (2002).  There have been some explorations of the educative value of simulation 
teaching.  See, e.g., Paul S. Ferber, Adult Learning Theory and Simulations—Designing Simulations to 
Educate Lawyers, 9 Clinical L. Rev. 417, 428–34 (2002), but fewer for supervised case-based 
teaching.
 More consequentially with respect to cognitive instruction, live-client clinics are often limited to 
enrolling only third-year students by local practice order, whereas simulation courses can include 
second-year law students.  Indeed, they often seem especially aimed at second-year law students, so 
rather than focusing intensively on one particular and usually narrow kind of practice experience, they 
can have a broader, more survey-like purview.  This makes them especially well suited to teaching basic 
and advanced legal reasoning.  Also, the design of simulation classes usually makes them better suited 
for enrolling a larger number of students than live-client clinics, thus offering a wider pool of students 
the benefit of this sort of training.
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introduction into the “real” professional education offered in live-client clinics 
(although they certainly are both).  Instead, we can conceive of simulation-based 
courses serving both of these functions and as ideal sites for teaching students both 
the most elemental as well as the most complex forms of legal thought.  Together 
with the introductions offered in beginning doctrinal courses and legal research and 
writing courses, these sorts of classes can better prepare students to begin at a more 
advanced conceptual level, and consequently engage in more rapid and more 
sophisticated learning, both in subsequent live-client clinics and in actual practice 
settings.
II. DEFINING THE SKILLS OF LEGAL THINKING
 Of course, this raises a thorny question: exactly what are the basic skills of legal 
thinking?  To consider seriously whether any particular type of law teaching 
emphasizes “thinking like a lawyer,” we should have some agreed-upon set of criteria 
for what that phrase signifies.  Unfortunately, upon close examination, the meaning 
of the phrase turns out to be surprisingly opaque.  “Thinking like a lawyer” is a 
phrase so routinely used and so often self-referential that its meaning is generally left 
unexplained, or at least ill-articulated.20  Given the variability and subjectivity of 
potential meanings of the phrase, our use of it skates uncomfortably close to 
something that “we know when we see it.”  
 It is perhaps not surprising then, although possibly embarrassing to legal 
academia, that as recently as 2007, an article seeking solely to explore and define the 
meaning of the phrase “thinking like a lawyer” was still a valuable scholarly 
contribution.21  Natt Gantt’s investigation of the phrase seeks to review existing 
theories about the constitutive skills required for legal reasoning and to break down 
“thinking like a lawyer” into its cognitive components.22   To summarize (and risk 
oversimplifying)23 his project, Gantt breaks down the aims of basic legal reasoning 
into seven overarching processes or intellectual skills: 
  1. problem solving; 
  2. identifying legal issues; 
  3. logical reasoning; 
20. As early as 1971, the Carrington Report on legal curriculum described the phrase as “so circular that it 
is essentially meaningless.”  Ass’n of Am. Law Schs., Training for the Public Profession of Law: 
 (Paul Carrington ed., 1971), reprinted in Herbert L. Packer & Thomas Erlich, New 
Directions in Legal Education 129 (1972).
21. See Larry O. Natt Gantt, II, Deconstructing Thinking Like a Lawyer: Analyzing the Cognitive Components 
of the Analytical Mind, 29 Campbell L. Rev. 413 (2007). 
22. See id. at 418, 421–36.
23. Gantt’s theories are far more sophisticated than this cursory summation allows.  Moreover, he breaks 
many of the larger tasks (as listed infra text accompanying note 24) into far more detailed components. 
“Identifying legal issues,” for example, is subdivided into: assessing relevance, dissecting thought, and 
perceiving ambiguity.  Id. at 445–57.  Some components are further subdivided; for example, “assessing 
relevance” is subdivided into determining relevance before rules are known and determining relevance 
once rules are known.  Id. at 445–53.
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  4. arguing from rules;
  5. seeing all sides to a question;
  6. attending to detail;
  7. recognizing the “big” issues.24  
With the existing lack of consensus regarding what the hallmark thinking of lawyers 
constitutes, it may be easy for any of those in the profession to quibble with Gantt’s 
list.  Nonetheless, it provides as useful a summary as any of what we imagine to be 
the basic skills of legal thinking.
 But such a tolling of proficiencies in legal thought raises the question of how 
beginning lawyers acquire and practice these reasoning skills.  Paula Lustbader’s 
groundbreaking research on ways law students acquire mastery explicitly names a 
“Learning Progression” that takes place over five levels, encompassing twelve distinct 
stages.25  For Lustbader, each learning stage, or “construction site” (she uses building 
metaphors throughout her article), is both additive and reflective.  As students ascend 
to the next stage they “revisit previous ones and refine the skills they developed in 
the preceding stages.  Each time they get a more complicated problem or begin 
mastering a new doctrinal area, they may have to start the whole process over again.”26 
Lustbader’s work helps to describe ways that law students learn, to diagnose student 
problems, and to explain how and why law students’ thinking can become stuck, and 
it prescribes stage-specific solutions for common problems that students encounter in 
their development as legal thinkers.  
 The model of the Learning Progression presupposes that there is a discernable 
hierarchy of beginning, intermediate, and more advanced means of legal reasoning—
that is, it assumes that there are absolute distinctions between simpler and more 
complex forms of thought.27  In this regard, Lustbader’s theory echoes the more 
general classification of orders of conceptual skills that general educational researchers 
have been developing for more than half a century.  
 One influential general educational theorist, Benjamin Bloom, proposed more 
than five decades ago in his seminal Taxonomy of Educational Objectives that cognitive 
operations could be organized into six levels, moving from the simplest through 
24. Id. at 436–78.
25. See Paula Lustbader, Construction Sites, Building Types, and Bridging Gaps: A Cognitive Theory of the 
Learning Progression of Law Students, 33 Willamette L. Rev. 315 (1997).
26. Id. at 323 (citation omitted).
27. Consequently, the model presumes that there exists a general consensus of what each form of thought 
consists of.  In light of the multiplicity of meanings “thinking like a lawyer” might be given, this 
presumption is certainly challengeable.  Nonetheless, it is one I agree with.  Legal professionals can 
debate the details of what constitutes “smarter” or “more simplistic” thinking in law, but most would 
agree that such distinctions do, in fact, exist.  I imagine, too, that details of what a hierarchy of legal 
reasoning skills should look like might warrant further theorizing.  But like “thinking like a lawyer” 
itself, the very notion of a progression or ranking of thinking processes in law is a profitable one to 
consider even if we do not wholeheartedly ascribe to it or have not fully determined precisely what it 
entails. 
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increasingly complex operations to the highest orders of conceptual thinking.28 
Bloom’s early work has been revised and re-examined over the years, but the essence 
of his categorizations of thinking, commonly known as Bloom’s Taxonomy, remains 
well-respected and commonly used.
 Contemporary education theorists, following Bloom’s Taxonomy, have articulated 
six distinct levels in the cognitive domain (the “Taxonomy”): 
  I. remembering;
  II. understanding;
  III. applying;
  IV. analyzing;
  V. evaluating;
  VI. creating.29
While more expansive and layered versions of the Taxonomy have sometimes been 
represented as a wheel, the cognitive levels listed above are most often organized 
within an upside-down pyramid or in other ways portrayed wholly hierarchically.30 
Thus, in concordance with Lustbader’s theories, the Taxonomy presumes that there 
exist both lower and higher forms of thinking.  
 This notion makes intuitive sense to anyone who has ever graded a set of law 
school exams.  Some modes of thinking about legal problems simply seem more 
sophisticated, more advanced, just plain smarter than others.  Legal educators wish 
that we could somehow get all of our students to produce this higher-order analysis 
of legal problems.  This suggests, then, that one important objective of education, 
perhaps the paramount one, is to move students along to the most advanced cognitive 
modes.  
 Certainly both Lustbader and Bloom, and his followers, do not believe that 
learning is only a progression from one stage/site/level of thinking to the next.  Nor 
do they suggest that all students begin or end at the same place.  Nonetheless, their 
schemata explicitly employ hierarchies from lower to higher modes of thought, from 
the basic to the complex, and take for granted that students must pass sequentially 
through each stage before moving onto the next.31  Indeed, legal education often 
(perhaps even usually) does follow that trajectory.  Many students, whatever their 
28. See A Comm. of Coll. & Univ. Exam’rs, Taxonomy of Educational Objectives: The 
Classification of Educational Goals, Handbook I: The Cognitive Domain (Benjamin Bloom 
ed., 1956) (introducing the Taxonomy and explaining its functions and uses). 
29. See A Taxonomy for Learning, Teaching, and Assessing: A Revision of Bloom’s Taxonomy of 
Educational Objectives 31 (Lorin W. Anderson et al. eds., abr. ed. 2001) [hereinafter Revised 
Taxonomy] (summarizing a cumulative investigation of Bloom’s Taxonomy and proposing a 
contemporary consensus of its working parts).  
30. Circular representations of the Taxonomy generally include all three of the educational objective 
“domains” that Bloom identified—cognitive, affective, and psychomotor.  Of these, Bloom’s cognitive 
domain usually garners the most attention and is the only one addressed in the common pyramidal 
representation of Bloom’s orders.  See generally id. at 258–59.
31. Lustbader, supra note 25, at 354 (“[R]emember that most students must progress through this series in 
sequence.”).
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prior academic achievements, enter law school with little to no real understanding of 
what will be expected of them, and spend much of the first year reshaping their 
intellectual landscape.   
 Yet learning is much messier, more recursive, more patchy than these models may 
seem to admit.32  Students often move through the experience of law school not fully 
aware of what level they are on; occasionally they venture into new, more advanced 
levels without having “graduated” from the previous stage; equally as frequently, they 
dip back and forth between the basic and the complex.33  It stands to reason, then, 
that even if primary doctrinal teaching in the first year of law school does a good job 
of inculcating legal reasoning skills (as the Carnegie Report posits they do),34 the 
task is hardly completed after one year of legal study.  Not all students will have 
mastered the nuances of interpreting law and applying rules to facts, but even those 
who have successfully done so should further aspire to advance their thinking.  
 Consequently I have found Bloom’s Taxonomy to be a useful tool in crystallizing 
my own understanding of the different levels on which my students may be operating. 
In fact, I have adopted a short summary of the Taxonomy in the form of a pamphlet-
sized “f lip chart” as a helpful teaching tool in some courses.35  The f lip chart, while 
not designed precisely to describe forms of legal reasoning, is easily adaptable to law. 
It makes explicit the various levels of thinking that lawyers may employ,36 providing 
convenient examples of the forms of questions that each level of thinking addresses.37 
32. Moreover, Lustbader would likely agree with that assessment of law students’ progress.  Cf. id. at 323. 
33. This perhaps argues for teaching law students to adopt the kinds of engaged self-awareness of progress 
in learning advocated by Michael Hunter Schwartz.  See generally Michael Hunter Schwartz, 
Expert Learning for Law Students (2005).  Schwartz urges law students to become “self-regulated 
learners,” moving repeatedly and seamlessly between planning, performing, and ref lecting on their 
learning.  Id. at 3.  Doing so, he suggests, has been shown to improve students’ performance in a variety 
of disciplines.  See id. at 3–5.  It stands to reason that if progression among levels of thinking is a 
complicated process, teaching students to be attentive to their own learning might help them be more 
attuned to their own cognitive processes. 
34. Carnegie Report, supra note 1, at 51–54. 
35. See generally Edupress, Quick Flip Questions for the Revised Bloom’s Taxonomy (2001) 
[hereinafter Taxonomy Flip-Chart].  This f lip-chart, which promotes itself as “an indispensable tool 
for . . . [t]eachers . . . [p]arents . . . [and] [s]tudents,” has stacked tabs arranging the various levels 
vertically.  Id.  The page for each level offers key words (generally verbs) that epitomize the work being 
done on that level and shows examples of the kinds of questions an inquiry at the level might generate. 
I have found this f lip-chart to be a good resource because it is intuitively organized and inexpensive. 
My thanks to Colleen Grady, who introduced me and many others to this chart during a 2007 conference 
presentation. 
36. Understanding the various levels of thinking is a worthwhile goal, at least according to those who 
advocate the value of metacognition for adult learners.  See Robin A. Boyle, Employing Active-Learning 
Techniques and Metacognition in Law School: Shifting Energy from Professor to Student, 81 U. Det. Mercy 
L. Rev. 1 (2003); Michael Hunter Schwartz, Teaching Law Students to be Self-Regulated Learners, 2003 
Mich. St. DCL L. Rev. 447.  There has been discussion of teaching metacognitive strategies to law 
students for at least two decades.  See Paul T. Wangerin, Learning Strategies for Law Students, 52 Alb. L. 
Rev. 471, 478–79 (1988). 
37. The chart helps students identify, understand, and assess the differences among intellectual tasks such 
as summarizing the material they study (Level II—understanding); making inferences or categorizations 
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The Taxonomy is a useful tool for identifying more basic and more advanced thinking 
in law.  It can show precisely what we expect law students to master early on in their 
legal training: not simply remembering and understanding legal concepts, but also 
applying them in order to analyze new scenarios.  But as much as we want these mid-
level mental processes to become ever more intuitive, automatic, and expertly-executed, 
we also want to speed law students toward the most sophisticated forms of thinking 
in and about law.
III. SITUATION-BASED PROBLEM-SOLVING TEACHES AND DEVELOPS THESE  
 REASONING SKILLS
 If we are willing to consider clinical teaching as training in legal thinking, it is 
not hard to conclude that simulation-based courses fulfill (and advance) the role of 
“cognitive apprenticeship” in complement to doctrinal teaching.  After all, it is not 
inevitable or even guaranteed that students will pick up cognitive skills in doctrinal 
classes, to the extent that there is nothing about learning contract law that necessarily 
teaches students the habits of mind that define legal thinking.  Rather, law school 
faculty deliberately organize the experience of introductory doctrinal classes to make 
that process an intrinsic part of the course, and stress legal analysis as one of the 
major components of it.  There is no essential reason that clinical courses cannot be 
conceptualized the same way—as arenas that emphasize both content and a rigorous 
training in process. 
 As an example, let’s imagine a fairly typical scenario designed to teach client 
counseling and negotiation.  The student possesses some basic information about the 
client’s factual scenario38 and must work with the client to prepare for upcoming 
settlement talks.  What kind of questions does the student need to ask, and how 
would she answer them in order to help the client work through the problem 
successfully? 
 Usually, the student’s best strategy would be to think through the problem by 
starting from the end point: that is, she would work in conjunction with the client to 
define the ultimate goals for settlement.39  But to define realistic goals means that 
the student must have an extremely nuanced understanding of the client’s current 
situation.  To get there she has to have discovered as much as she could from the 
client.  Asking the client for information is not sufficient, however—for a lawyer 
doing her job well, gathering information from the client is not simply a process of 
serving as a waiting vessel for a client to fill with narrative.  
 Fact development is instead a dynamic, engaged kind of inquiry that includes 
prodding the client to think through things differently and more specifically by 
about it (Level IV—analyzing); or making informed judgments about it (Level V—evaluating).  See 
generally Taxonomy Flip-Chart, supra note 35.
38. Facts are gathered either from interviewing the client or through a given narrative summary of the 
client’s circumstances.
39. See Donald G. Gifford, Legal Negotiation: Theory and Applications 3–6 (1989); G. Nicholas 
Herman et al., Legal Counseling and Negotiating: A Practical Approach 67–89 (2001).
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asking the kinds of questions that will actually reveal more about the strengths and 
limitations of the client’s position.40  Moreover, as clinical courses teach students, 
and experienced practitioners know, fact development and goal setting are not static. 
What one knows about a given area of law guides the kinds of questions one asks, as 
well as the sorts of facts one develops.  This, in turn, determines what parts of the 
law one will research.  Consequently, wherever the law is ambiguous, the developed 
facts will shape the legal arguments the lawyers will make to best advantage their 
clients (or at the very least, guide clients about what to expect if the case were not 
settled but litigated or even dropped).  The development of novel arguments or 
interpretations of law may similarly prompt further factual investigation so that the 
research cycle turns back on itself one or more times.
 By engaging in these tasks the student is necessarily using all of the “thinking 
like a lawyer” skills proffered by Gantt: in order to work with the client to solve the 
problem, the student/lawyer has to identify legal issues, which requires logically applying 
rules to facts within the scenario, from the perspective of both her client and all other 
parties involved.  To do this most effectively, she must both attend to the details of the 
facts and the applicable law, while still seeing the big picture of her client’s ultimate 
desired outcome, as well as the larger body of law this case brings to bear.41 
 It cannot simply be the case that a typical second-year clinical law student is able 
to do all of this expertly because she has already fully internalized these habits of 
mind and is just plugging them into the situation at hand in order to practice advising 
clients.  If that were genuinely true, there would quite literally be no need for legal 
education beyond the first year of introductory classes and the summary of advanced 
doctrine offered by a few agreed-upon upper-level survey courses.  The experience 
new lawyers need in order to become experts in their fields could easily be gleaned in 
subsequent on-the-job training.42   
 I think, however, this is too limited an image of the typical law student’s 
intellectual work in such a task.  Depending upon your point of view, this is either an 
overly pessimistic perspective on the work the student-lawyer is engaged in while 
counseling her client, or an overly-optimistic perception of what the typical law 
student has fully mastered.  I suspect, instead, that the process of thinking through 
40. For a brief but insightful discussion of the “interaction effects” in lawyer/client fact-gathering, see 
Anthony G. Amsterdam et al., Lawyering by the Book 134–39 (N.Y.U. Lawyering Program 
2008).  For a far more extended disquisition on what clinical teachers have to say about how lawyers and 
clients develop facts and set goals, see Alexander Scherr, Lawyers and Decisions: A Model of Practical 
Judgment, 47 Vill. L. Rev. 161 (2002). 
41. See Gantt, supra note 21, at 437–78 (describing the cognitive components of “thinking like a lawyer”).
42. Indeed, such a view might look favorably upon a dramatic reduction in the time and energy currently 
devoted to law school education, and a return to the more apprentice-based model of previous centuries 
for new-lawyer training.  But this is hardly the reform advocated by the Carnegie Report, and even the 
most pessimistic examinations into the future of legal educations do not suggest that this might be the 
direction we are heading.  See, e.g., Richard A. Matasar, The Rise and Fall of American Legal Education, 
49 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 465, 498–500, 504 (2005) (exploring problems and criticisms of the current 
legal educational model, including arguments that it lasts too long, costs too much money, and teaches 
too little that is of practical use in the profession).
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how best to solve the problems a client presents necessarily develops and expands the 
cognitive landscape for almost any law student assigned that task.  Each question she 
asks forces the student to imagine where she might go next; each fact or law or client 
response creates new opportunities to deepen and broaden her analysis.  Resolving 
the problem necessarily rehearses, and thus helps make automatic, the fundamental 
processes (lowest and earliest levels) of legal thinking.43  Simultaneously, the act of 
working through the exercise inevitably moves the student toward the more advanced 
and conceptual forms of reasoning that lawyers use.  
 That is, it must be true that at least some of what the student was doing during 
the simulation does function on the most simplistic levels of the Taxonomy.  At the 
very least, the competent student/lawyer must remember and understand the client’s 
situation, the relevant area of law, and the client’s goals.  But to resolve the problem, 
she must also engage in the mid-level processes that we most commonly conceive of 
as “thinking like a lawyer”: applying the law to the client’s situation and analyzing 
facts and law in order to best advise the client about possible outcomes.  Working 
through a simulated counseling session with a client can thus provide profoundly 
useful practice and reinforcement of those mental processes.  
 Yet, in order to construct a fully realized set of suggestions and possible solutions 
for her client, the student must also engage in the highest levels of cognition: those 
processes that the Taxonomy identifies as “evaluating” and “creating.”  Where 
analyzing a situation consists of determining its major issues and themes, classifying 
and categorizing it, distinguishing between its constitutive parts, working out causes 
and effects, identifying relevant evidence for the client’s position, drawing inferences 
from the law, and drawing conclusions from all of these processes,44 evaluating a 
situation asks a very different set of questions.  Rather than just probing the material 
of the case (whether the client’s story, the law, or the connections between them), 
evaluation requires the student to make substantive judgments about the material she 
is considering, and about how to approach the client’s preferred outcome.  The 
student is not only classifying and categorizing, but also judging and prioritizing. 
Having considered all sides of the legal problem and visualized the big picture, she 
can now compare the validity of the arguments that might be propounded, and 
support her client’s case by both the facts and her own judgments.
 Alongside evaluation, moreover, the student may find opportunities to create. 
Having judged the situation, she must predict the various outcomes of the factual 
and legal arguments she and the other parties might make. And having prioritized 
her points, she also has to be able to adapt, adjust, and modify them in response to 
43. Automating the fundamental processes is valuable; evidence suggests that one hallmark difference 
between the cognitive strategies of novices and experts is the speed in narrowing focus that comes with 
practice.  See Stephen Ellmann, Fast Talking (New York Law Sch. Clinical Research Inst. Paper No. 
05/06-10, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=871747. 
44. Some of the questions the Taxonomy suggests in order to achieve these processes are: What are the 
parts or features of . . . ?  How is . . . related to . . . ?  Why do you think . . . ?  What is the theme of . . . ? 
What inference can you make about . . . ?  How would you classify . . . ?  What conclusions can you draw 
from . . . ?  See generally Revised Taxonomy, supra note 29.
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input from the other parties or (if it comes to that) the judge, so that in taking all of 
these factors into consideration she can best act to maximize her client’s position or 
options.  While analysis and evaluation are, to varying degrees, reactive, the realm of 
creation is generative and imaginative, interweaving possibility with probability and 
pragmatism.
 When the required intellectual tasks are broken down in this manner, we can see 
the similarities between the cognitive work required in simulation courses and 
doctrinal classes.  Both require students to internalize the basic processes of 
remembering and understanding, while they also demand more sophisticated 
thinking in applying and analyzing what they have learned.  At their best, both push 
students further along the spectrum toward the most demanding kind of intellectual 
work: making judgments, offering opinions, and creating new ways of looking at the 
problem at hand.   
 Moreover, because we know that students learn material best when it is presented 
in context,45 the holistic experience of simulations along with the exigencies of having 
to solve a particular problem for a particular client combine to construct an ideal 
environment for students to learn both the nuts and bolts and the finer points of 
legal analysis.  Extended simulations, then, at the very least add practice-skills 
education to students’ previously-honed reasoning skills; at their best, they cultivate, 
nurture, and encourage increasingly sophisticated and complex forms of “thinking 
like a lawyer.”
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL PEDAGOGY
 If we integrate these insights about teaching simulations into our concept of legal 
pedagogy, where might we end up?  Perhaps, exactly where we are now.  There may 
be no need to change anything in most law schools’ current educational model. 
Noting that there is some overlap in the educational objectives of different law school 
classes may give us room to acknowledge some valuable repetition in the usual 
sequence of legal education, but this hardly requires a revision.  But a move toward 
seeing simulations as an essential part of students’ training in legal cognition might 
press us toward refocusing (or at least refining) some of their operation, and might 
call for a larger re-imagination of their role in the education of new lawyers.
 It is axiomatic that most educators are likely to be most successful in teaching 
what we deliberately set out to cover, and what we lavish the most attention upon.  If 
we imagine simulation courses solely as introducing some of the interpersonal skills 
that lawyers may need, we will accordingly construct simulations devoted primarily 
to teaching and honing those particular skills.  For example, with the goal of practical 
rehearsal in mind, a clinical professor might reasonably decide that the more 
opportunities a student has to practice a particular task such as counseling a client 
45. See Gerald F. Hess, Listening to Our Students: Obstructing and Enhancing Learning in Law School, 31 
U.S.F. L. Rev. 941, 943 (1997) (citing Stephen D. Brookfield, Adult Learners: Motives for Learning and 
Implications for Practice, in Teaching and Learning in the College Classroom 137, 144 (Kenneth 
A. Feldman & Michael B. Paulsen eds., 1994)).
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and to get feedback on her performance, the better.46  In light of the resource 
limitations faced by any class seeking to offer experiential learning and individualized 
critique, the faculty member might well decide that students would best benefit from 
repeated opportunities to engage in relatively short and straightforward exercises, 
each designed to introduce or rehearse specific techniques.  
 But a simulation intended explicitly to help students deepen their intellectual 
grasp of legal concepts and achieve higher orders of reasoning might engender a very 
different set of design considerations.  The problems would likely be more complex. 
Problems demanding higher orders of thinking require students to puzzle through 
overlapping facts, and to make nuanced choices about how to interpret and frame 
arguably-applicable legal doctrine.  Thus they are not likely to be scenarios that can 
be conveyed in a few short summary memos or a collection of canned cases.  Rather, 
the facts are more likely to unfold through a series of live or transcribed interviews, 
depositions, and other (simulated) artifacts of legal or factual research.  Understanding 
legal doctrine is more likely developed through individual student/lawyer’s own 
definition of the legal question and subsequent topical research, and so on. 
 In addition to project design, a shift or expansion of the educational objective 
might have ramifications for the evaluation of student work.  Since it takes time to 
articulate the sorts of reasoning steps that expert thinkers might take in order to 
work through these more multilayered problems, instructors would necessarily need 
more time to give different types of critical feedback to their students.  Their feedback 
would necessarily have to include suggestions to improve students’ practical 
performance, but should also try making visible to students the many layers of 
cognitive work that they may have been using implicitly, as well as providing students 
with assistance in moving toward higher orders of legal thought.47  It is already true 
that much of the work of teaching simulations involves modeling analytical, 
evaluative, and creative ways of dealing with clients and the law.  But an explicit 
legal reasoning-oriented clinical program might add to that by focusing more, or at 
least differently, on ways to guide students towards those more sophisticated ways of 
thinking about legal problem-solving.  
46. Support for that approach can be found in the notion that genuine expertise is usually achieved only 
after an unusually large amount of time devoted to practice.  Researchers have formulated a magical 
number of 10,000 hours rehearsal time as foundational for success in almost any field.  For a discussion 
and summary of the 10,000-hour rule, see generally Malcolm Gladwell, Outliers: The Story of 
Success 35–68 (2008).  For more academic exploration of the 10,000-hour rule, see K. Anders Ericsson 
et al., The Role of Deliberate Practice in the Acquisition of Expert Performance, 100 Psychol. Rev. 363 
(1993) (arguing that expert performers develop their characteristics through a life-long period of 
deliberate effort, as opposed to being born with innate talent). 
47. Obviously, trading off these varying goals, or better yet seeking to find ways to combine them such that 
they do not have to become zero-sum exchanges, may be the best choice of all.  I mean in no way to 
suggest that clinicians replace one narrow set of objectives with another.
 I should add, too, that I do not mean here to diminish the fact that this sort of intensive skills/theory 
teaching is what many teachers of simulations, both in clinical and doctrinal courses, already do.  But I 
do mean to suggest that we can be clearer about the multiple objectives of such simulation teaching.  If 
cognitive training is defined as at least one of several important goals in that pedagogy, we might make 
some different choices in exercise design.
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 More broadly stated, however they are designed, simulation-based courses 
imagined as part of law students’ cognitive apprenticeship, in addition to the central 
locus of practical training, would have a very different role to play in our collective 
understanding of current practices in legal education.  Perhaps without saying so, we 
are already exceeding the Carnegie Report’s expectations of clinical pedagogy as 
providing practical training and preparation for the profession.  Where the Carnegie 
Report sees practical training as “additive” to the central mission of law schools, 
re-framed basic clinical courses might be seen as a central locus for the “integrative” 
teaching that the Carnegie Report authors so fervently desire.48 
 There are multiple directions such an insight could lead us toward.  Whether this 
stance argues for moving more of these kinds of courses into the first year, or 
expanding the offerings and requirements for simulation-based courses in the second 
and third years; whether it means rethinking who teaches these courses49 and how 
they are integrated with other parts of the curriculum: these questions are beyond 
the scope of this brief essay.  However, I would encourage us to embrace this 
opportunity to challenge our students and ourselves, and to take advantage of what 
is currently an underused, and under-theorized, resource.
 Thus, I do not mean simply to suggest that all law schools ought to expand 
clinical offerings or that all students ought to take simulation clinics (although 
perhaps this would be a good idea).  Instead I want the body of legal educators, both 
clinical and non-clinical, to remember that these classes serve not only to teach 
“practical skills,” but serve also the crucial educational function of inculcating in 
students fundamentally legal ways of thinking.  In fact, for anyone used to thinking 
of doctrinal course work as serving this function, it ought to seem unsurprising that 
simulations will do so as well—perhaps more thoroughly, with greater depth, and 
greater “sticking power.”  After all, what is the kind of hypothetical, fact-pattern-
based essay examination typically given in such courses but a cursory (and somewhat 
uni-dimensional) simulation?
V. CONCLUSION
 Simulation courses are not just staging grounds for the “real” work of actual legal 
practice; they are a space in which legal theorizing is strengthened and deepened.  If 
we frame simulation-based clinical teaching as part of an integrated web of legal 
education that can encourage and generate sophisticated understandings of lawyering 
work, we can use much of what most law schools are already doing to imagine a 
richer, more layered, more successful law school curriculum.  One in which the 
Carnegie Report’s authors could surely take pride.
48. See Carnegie Report, supra note 1, at 191–92.
49. Which may, or may not, also include reconsidering status distinctions among different legal subjects or 
different law teachers.  The Carnegie Report itself expresses concern over the devaluing of clinical 
subjects or faculty.  See id. at 88, 91–94.
